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ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IN
WASHINGTON: THE CHILDREN
ARE STILL CRYING
I. INTRODUCTION
To a child seeking redress for the loss of his parent's consortium' occa-
sioned by a negligent third party, the legal system must seem cruel in-
deed. Peering up at the bench, the child hears the judge admit the serious-
ness of his injury, 2 but state that children have no remedy for such loss. 3
On the other hand, the child may see the same judge allow a parent4 or
spouse 5 to recover for loss of consortium. Then, upon asking for an ex-
planation for this inconsistency, the child hears the judge tell him that he
must ask the legislators. Finally, upon asking the legislators why they
allow parents but not children to recover, the child discovers that the leg-
islators simply overlooked him.
1. Consortium has been variously defined. Some courts define consortium as love, affection,
care, services, companionship, and society. See, e.g., Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267
N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91,
93-94, 614 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1980). Other courts include, and emphasize, sexual relations as an
element of consortium. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
Emphasizing sexual relations to the exclusion of other elements of consortium would obviously
preclude a child from claiming damages for loss of consortium. Because the Washington Supreme
Court did not emphasize sexual relations in Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91, 614 P.2d
1272 (1980), however, and because Washington allows actions for loss of filial consortium, see note
4 infra, this comment does not discuss this possible barrier to a child's consortium action.
In any event, commentators reject the notion that children should not recover for loss of con-
sortium because they do not lose any sexual relationship. See, e.g., Love, Tortious Interference with
the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J.
590,614-15 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
3. Id. Two jurisdictions, however, do permit children to sue for loss of parental consortium. See
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich.
App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd. 49 U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981). For the jurisdictions that have
denied such an action, see Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Neb. 1980).
4. Parents in Washington can recover for the loss of their child's consortium when the child is
injured or killed. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1979). This section states:
The mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a
minor child, or a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support.
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication expenses, and loss
of services and support, damages may be recovered for the loss of love and companionship of
the child and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under
all the circumstances of the case, may be just.
5. A spouse can recover for the loss of the other spouse's consortium. Lundgren v. Whitney's,
Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91,614 P.2d 1272 (1980).
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This comment examines the reasons advanced by Washington courts to
deny children a cause of action for loss of parental consortium when a
parent is negligently injured. 6 It discusses the inconsistent positions that
courts and legislatures have taken in awarding or refusing to award recov-
ery for loss of consortium by various classes of plaintiffs, and argues that
children, like parents and spouses, should also have a separate con-
sortium action. This comment then proposes guidelines for legislation
creating a child's consortium action that limits any dangers of permitting
children to recover. Finally, this comment concludes that, if the legisla-
ture fails to act, courts should nevertheless respond to the plight of the
child by recognizing his consortium claim.
I. CHILDREN'S RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL
CONSORTIUM IN WASHINGTON
Children have presented their claim for parental consortium to Wash-
ington appellate courts only twice. In 1958, the supreme court7 denied a
separate action to children because there was no precedent and on the
even more questionable ground that children could already recover for
their loss of consortium in their parent's action. 8 Then, in 1979, the court
of appeals 9 elaborated on the supreme court's decision and deferred any
significant change in the law to the legislature.
A. The Questionable Rationale of Erhardt v. Havens, Inc.10
In Erhardt, a mother became paralyzed in an accident allegedly caused
by a hospital's negligence. As a result of her paralysis, the mother could
not care for or even recognize her children. The children, therefore, sued
for damages resulting from loss of support, care, training, and educa-
tion. 11 Although the court had never permitted such damages in negli-
6. This comment is limited to discussion of the child's action for damages for loss of consortium
when his parent is negligently injured, but not wrongfully killed. A Washington child currently can
recover for loss of consortium in an action for the wrongful death of the parent. See note 13 infra.
For convenience, therefore, the phrase "negligently injured" will be omitted in reference to the
consortium action unless inclusion of the phrase is necessary for clarity or comparison.
7. Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010(1958).
8. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
9. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979).
10. 53 Wn. 2d 103,330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
11. Brief for Appellant, Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958). The
children specifically alleged loss of support, maintenance, education, nurture, care, training, atten-
tion, acts of kindness, comfort, solace and companionship of their natural mother. Id. at 6. The
inclusion of support and maintenance in this list may have been a tactical error. A child's claim of
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gence actions, 12 the children pointed to judicial sanction of similar dam-
ages in wrongful death actions. 13 They argued that since their mother
could presently give them no more care than if she were dead, they were
damaged to the same extent and should be permitted to recover. 14 The
children also contended that they should be permitted to recover because
their action was no different from an action for alienation of affections
that other courts permitted. 15
The Erhardt court, however, summarily rejected both analogies. 16 Al-
though the court recognized that the children had suffered actual injury, 17
it was reluctant to create !an action which did not exist at common law.
The court did state that it might allow a child to maintain a separate con-
sortium action if he could show a "compelling necessity.' '18 However,
the Erhardt children could not show a "compelling necessity" since the
respondent had conceded that all the children's damages were recoverable
by the parent in the parent's own action.' 9 Despite the absence of pre-
cedent for such a concession, the Erhardt court evidently agreed that the
parent could recover for the children's damages. 20
damages for loss of parental financial support is sure to provoke fear of double recovery since the
same damages may be recovered by a parent in his own action. See note 33 infra.
12. Indeed, at the time Erhardt was decided, no court had permitted children to recover for loss
of parental consortium where the parent had not been killed.
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010 (1979), as construed in Aronson v. City of Everett, 136
Wash. 319, 320, 239 P. 10 11, 1014 (1925). See also Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc.,
43 Wn. 2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953); Hinton v. Carmody, 182 Wash. 123, 130-31, 45 P.2d 32, 35
(1935).
14. Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 106, 330 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1958).
15. Washington later permitted a parent to recover for malicious alienation of affections and
interference with the parent-child relationship. Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wn. App. 13, 510 P.2d 250
(1973). In Strode, the court, by analogy, rejected many of the traditional reasons for denying children
recovery for loss of parental consortium. Id. at 19-20,510 P.2d at 254.
16. The court did not even discuss the analogy to wrongful death. It distinguished recovery for
alienation of affections on the ground that it is an intentional tort and the children had brought a
negligence action. Erhardtv. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 106, 330 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1958).
17. Id.
18. Id. An example of such "compelling necessity" might be parental refusal to bring an action.
See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
19. The plaintiffs urged the court to reevaluate the common law, but the court responded:
This we might do under compelling necessity, but we find no occasion to do so here because the
father himself, who is the guardian of the infant appellants, may maintain that action in his own
name, and, by the respondent's concession, recover every item of damage claimed by the appel-
lants.
Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 106-07, 330 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1958).
20. See note 19 supra. The Erhardt court did not question the propriety of such recovery. How-
ever, the court may have impliedly assumed that the children's damages were the same as the parent's
damages. If so, the court was not really allowing the parent to recover for the children's damages, but
rather preventing children from recovering for what their parent had already recovered. Indeed, this is
what the respondent argued. Brief for Respondent at 13-14, Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d
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Whether children can actually recover damages resulting from loss of
consortium in the parent's action is doubtful. The remedy suggested by
the Erhardt court is in fact contrary to the general principle that no person
shall be permitted to recover for another person's injuries. 21 Attorneys,
therefore, should not be permitted to argue for the children's recovery
when pursuing the parent's claim. Hence, any award of children's dam-
ages in the parent's action can only be made by the jury on its own initia-
tive-certainly an unreliable and unlikely result.
Thus, although Erhardt holds only that children have no separate ac-
tion for loss of parental consortium, the practical effect of the decision is
to preclude recovery altogether.
B. The Legislative Deferral and Balancing Test of Roth v. Bell2 2
Judy Roth ingested contraceptives that caused a stroke and subsequent
impairment of her communicative and motor abilities. As a result of her
injuries, she could not interact normally with her children. Alleging neg-
ligence by the prescribing doctor and contraceptive manufacturer, the
children claimed damages for loss of support, loss of companionship, and
destruction of the parent-child relationship. 23
Relying on Erhardt, the Roth court stated that no such cause of action
existed.24 The Roth court, however, went further than Erhardt by sug-
gesting that the children's cause of action should never be permitted. 25
Although Erhardt had qualified its denial by retaining the option to permit
children's recovery in cases of "compelling necessity," the Roth court
did not even discuss whether the Roth children presented a compelling
situation. Moreover, the Roth court suggested that the high cost of per-
mitting children to recover26 necessitated denying them a cause of action.
To be sure, Roth deferred the ultimate decision to the legislature since
the court believed that consortium actions raise public policy issues. 27
103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958). Nevertheless, a literal interpretation of the court's language is that the
court permitted the parent to recover the children's damages.
21. See generally 86 C.JS. Torts § 31 (1954).
22. 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979).
23. Id. at 93, 600 P.2d at 603. The children also claimed damages for loss of advice and for
emotional injury. Id. See also note 11 supra regarding the advisability of alleging loss of support.
24. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 104, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979).
25. In doing so, the court also rejected both parties' attempts to draw favorable inferences from
prior legislative action in creating a cause of action for parents to recover for the loss of their child's
consortium. The court refused to draw inferences from legislative silence. Id. at 96-100, 600 P.2d at
605-07.
26. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text infra.
27. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 101, 600 P.2d 602, 607-08 (1979).
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Stating that "[t]he decision whether the imposition of harm shall result in
legal liability essentially involves a 'balancing [of] the interest of the in-
jured party to compensation against the view that a negligent act should
have some end to its legal consequences'," the Roth court argued that the
legislature was the proper place to do the balancing. 28
Nevertheless, the Roth court concluded by weighing the competing
policies itself.29 In so doing, it rejected a Michigan decision, Berger v.
Weber,30 which permitted children's consortium actions. The Roth court
stated that Berger ignored the danger of unlimited liability. 31
Both Berger and Roth were concerned about the threat of multiple liti-
gation,32 the danger of overlapping recovery, 33 the inadequacy 34 and un-
certainty35 of damages, and the societffl cost 36 of permitting children to
recover. 37 The Roth court, however, believed that the weight of each con-
28. Id. (quoting Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn. 2d 424,435,553 P.2d 1096, 1102 (1976)).
29. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 100-04, 600 P.2d 602, 607-09 (1979). For the competing
policies, see notes 32-37 and accompanying text infra.
30. 82 Mich. App. 199,267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981).
31. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103,600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979).
32. Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124, 129 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W.
2648 (1981); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979). See Note, Action by
Child for Indirect Interference With Family Relationship, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1023 (1956). Other
courts have also been concerned with the possibility of multiple litigation. See, e.g., Jeune v. Del E.
Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723, 724 (1954); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368
P.2d 57, 59-60 (1962). See also Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 528, § 5(e) (1976).
33. Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124, 129 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W.
2648 (1981); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979). See Note, supra note
32. For another case concerned with overlapping or double recovery, see Halberg v. Young, 41
Hawaii 634,59 A.L.R.2d 445,453 (1957).
34. Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128-29 (1978), aff'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 104, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979) (citing Borer
v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 563 P.2d 858, 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 310
(1977)).
35. Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128-29 (1978), aff'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979). See Note,
supra note 32.
36. Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128-30 (1978), aff'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979). Increased
cost of insurance in particular is a concern of many courts. The California Supreme Court stated:
We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of parental consortium
merely because the money to pay such awards comes initially from the "negligent" defendant
or his insurer. Realistically the burden of payment of awards for loss of consortium must be
borne by the public generally in increased insurance premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced
danger that accrues from the greater number of people who may choose to go without any insur-
ance.
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441,447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306
(1977).
37. The Roth court also mentioned five other considerations that weigh against creation of a
child's right of action. These are: the fact that the child has no enforceable claim to the parent's
services; the absence of precedent; the possibility of upsetting parent-tortfeasor settlements; the dan-
ger of fabricated actions; and the public policy expressed in the enactment of "heart balm" statutes.
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cern was greater than Berger had supposed them to be. The Roth court
suggested that the costs of permitting children's consortium recovery
would outweigh the projected benefits. 38 Because of this imbalance, the
court believed that children should not be permitted a cause of action-
that is, unless the legislature should reach a contrary conclusion.
Thus, despite twenty-one years of inaction since the Erhardt court first
brought attention to the issue, the Roth court would continue to await a
legislative solution. More damaging from the child's perspective, how-
ever, is the policy balance struck by Roth, which concluded that the costs
of permitting the action outweigh the possible benefits. Such a conclusion
tends to discourage future action by litigants-and perhaps more impor-
tantly, by the legislature.
III. CRITICISM OF WASHINGTON'S DENIAL OF
CHILDREN'S RECOVERY
Although Washington is not alone in permitting spouses and parents,
but not children, to sue for loss of consortium, 39 the courts receive little
support from commentators. 40 Most commentators argue that the societal
cost of a child's action has been excessively overweighted and can be
ameliorated. Furthermore, allowing parents but not children to recover
for loss of consortium is senseless. If anyone should recover, it should be
the children. They need their parents more than their parents need them. 4'
A. The Excessive Weight Given to Adverse Societal Costs
One reason advanced by the majority of courts that deny children a
Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979). See Note, supra note 32, at 1024-25.
Although the Roth court cited the reasons, the reasons contradict the rationale in the rest of the
court's opinion. Throughout the opinion, the court suggested that common law was not a bar. It also
admitted the seriousness of the injury. Arguably, the inclusion of the citation to the Michigan Law
Review note was just a convenient way to summarize arguments that courts historically have used.
The arguments discussed in the text are those that have modem vitality.
38. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103-04, 600 P.2d 602, 608-09 (1979).
39. For the jurisdictions that have denied children a cause of action, see Hoesing v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Neb. 1980). For the jurisdictions that permit parents to
recover for the loss of their children's consortium, see Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461. 465
n.l, 563 P.2d 871,873 n.l, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315,317 n.l (1977).
40. See, e.g., Love, supra note 1; Note, The Child's Right to Sue For Loss Of A Parent's Love,
Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury To The Parent, 56 B.U.L. REv. 722 (1976);
Note, Limiting the Cause ofAction for Loss of Consortium, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 430 (1978); Note. The
Child's Cause ofAction For Loss of Consortium, 5 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 449 (1977).
41. See notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text infra.
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claim for loss of parental consortium is that defendants would face multi-
ple lawsuits .42 Courts argue that each child might bring an action after the
tortfeasor settled with the injured parent. Although such multiplicity is
theoretically possible, it could easily be avoided by requiring children to
join in the parent's action. Indeed, some courts already use joinder as a
means of minimizing litigation when a spouse has a consortium claim.43
Secondly, courts are sometimes fearful of the possibility that the
child's recovery would overlap with the parent's. 44 Most significantly,
courts are concerned that juries will first award a parent his loss of in-
come, and then award the child loss of support. To be sure, such an award
would amount to compensating for the same damage twice. Secondarily,
some courts, especially the Erhardt court, believe juries may already
award damages for the children's loss of consortium in the parent's
award. 45 Again, the courts argue, the family would receive double recov-
ery.
Even under the present law, however, there is no assurance against
double recovery. Arguably, under the present system where juries might
award consortium damages without clear instruction on the law, the
chance of double recovery is greater. Only open argument of each claim
will prevent the jury from blindly awarding damages. 46 Moreover, under
the present law, there is no assurance that the child will be adequately
compensated. 47
Overlapping recovery, like the possible multiplicity of suits, can be
easily avoided. Clear jury instructions could specify which damages were
properly recoverable by the parent, and which by the child. 48 Joinder
would prevent any discrepancy in interpretation between juries.49 Fur-
thermore, the adversary system and the allocation of the burden of proof
would ensure equitable awards.
A third major concern of the courts is that damages for loss of con-
sortium are too uncertain.50 Although they believe the child is actually
injured, the courts question the jury's ability to accurately measure the
42. See note 32 supra.
43. See Note, 56 B.U.L. REv., supra note 40, at 733 n.91. Joinder is also desirable because the
comparative negligence of the parent should offset the child's recovery. See notes 106-07 and ac-
companying text infra.
44. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
45. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
46. See Note, 56 B.U.L. REv., supra note 40, at 736.
47. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text infra.
48. See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
49. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
50. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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damage. Moreover, courts argue that money cannot restore parental love
and companionship anyway. 51 Such arguments are thin.
While the difficulty of measuring intangible damages points to a weak-
ness of the legal system, the difficulty is even weaker as an excuse for
awarding nothing to compensate injured children. 52 The inadequacy of
money is also a weak excuse since some compensation is better than none
at all. The courts have rightfully concerned themselves with limiting ac-
tions for intangible injuries, 53 but here the limit is arbitrarily narrow.
Acknowledging this present problem, courts and legislatures already per-
mit spouses54 and parents55 to recover intangible consortium awards. The
child's injury can hardly be characterized as more intangible than those
awards.
A final major concern of courts is that permitting children's recovery,
in addition to permitting other consortium actions, would be an unwar-
ranted financial burden on tortfeasors and society. 56 Actuality of the
child's injury aside, courts are fearful of increasing insurance rates and
unfairly burdening tortfeasors. They justify permitting parents and
spouses to recover, but not children, by suggesting the typical parent is
akin to "the old woman in the shoe. " 57 Each parental injury would sup-
posedly spawn several children's actions.
Disregarding for the moment the questionable discrimination between
family members, 58 this comment and other commentators submit that the
courts' conception of the typical family is inaccurate. Almost half of
American families are childless and only five percent have more than four
minor children. 59 Indeed, the average family size includes only slightly
51. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
52. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 453-55, 563 P.2d 858, 866-67. 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 310-11 (1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting) Berger v. Weber, 89 Mich. App. 199, 267
N.W.2d 124, 128-29 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981).
53. See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn. 2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976) (to be com-
pensable, mental suffering must at least be manifested by objective symptoms).
54. See Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980); Annot.. 36
A.L.R.3d 900 (1971). See note 94 infra.
55. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1979). See also Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d
441,465 n.1, 563 P.2d 871, 873 n.1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 n.l (1977).
56. See note 36 supra.
57. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302 (1977). In Borer, the injured parent had nine children.
58. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra (discussing this discrimination).
59. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 47 (100th ed. 1979) (1978 data) [hereinafter cited as 1979 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. Forty-six
and nine tenths percent of American families have no children; 20.3 percent have one child; 19.0
percent have two children; and 8.8 percent have three children. Id. See Borer v. American Airlines,
Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441,457-58,563 P.2d 858, 868-69, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 312-13 (1977) (Mosk. J.,
dissenting) (making the same argument).
Vol. 56:487, 1981
Children's Loss of Consortium
more than one child.60 Consequently, the cost to society and tortfeasors is
much less than some courts believe. To be sure, it is likely that society
will face some increased cost if children are permitted to recover. The
actual increase, however, will be much less than purported by courts-
and might even be insubstantial since juries may already award some
form of children's consortium damages. 61
Even if the cost of the children's actions were substantial, there is no
difference in cost to justify discriminating between children and other
consortium claimants. The number of children recovering for loss of par-
ental consortium actually would be comparable to the number of spouses
or parents recovering in their respective actions. 62 The time period for
which children would be allowed to recover could also be comparable if
courts simply limited the child's recovery to the period of his minority.
63
Thus, the overall individual financial burden of the child's action would
be no greater than either the parent's or the spouse's action.
When added to the costs of the consortium actions already permitted,
the cost of the child's action may affect insurance costs; but it certainly
seems unfair to deny the child a cause of action merely because other
family members beat him to the courts.
B. The Inconsistency in Washington Law
Washington recognizes a wide range of familial consortium recovery
rights. 64 As aforementioned, a spouse and parent can recover when the
60. This figure is based on a weighted average derived from the statistics compiled in 1979 STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 59, at 47.
61. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
62. The number of people likely to recover under each consortium action can be estimated by
multiplying the number of potential accident victims by the average number of potential consortium
claimants per accident victim, yielding the following figures: 100 million spousal consortium claim-
ants, 70 million parents who can claim loss of filial consortium, and 90 million children who can
claim loss of parental consortium (figures based on 1979 STATISTICAL ABsTRACr, supra note 59, at 8,
42, 47, 49). These calculations show that the potential number of claimants under each consortium
action is roughly equal.
63. This limitation counters arguments that the child would have a longer joint life expectancy
with his parent than one spouse has with another spouse. As limited by the suggestion in the text, the
period of recovery by the child would probably be less than the joint life expectancy of a husband and
wife.
64. Because Washington permits a parent to claim damages for loss of filial consortium when a
child is injured, Washington's range of familial consortium recovery rights is already one of the
widest. Although recovery for loss of spousal consortium is almost unanimously allowed, Washing-
ton is one of only eight jurisdictions that permit recovery for loss of filial consortium-and one of
only three jurisdictions to do so by statute. See Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 465 n. 1,
563 P. 2d 871, 873 n. 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 n. 1 (1977). See also note 84 and accompanying text
infra.
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other spouse or children are injured. 65 Similarly, spouses, parents, and
children can recover for loss of consortium in an action for wrongful
death. 66 Furthermore, courts permit a "consortium-like" recovery in an
action for alienation of affections. 6  Yet, Washington fails to permit chil-
dren to recover for loss of consortium when the parent is only nonfatally
injured. 68 Such a stand is inconsistent. 69
Washington is not only inconsistent in permitting spouses and parents,
but not children, to recover; it is also inconsistent in rationale. For in-
stance, children's consortium damages are too intangible, 70 but parent's
damages are not. 71 One court rejected traditional reasons for denying
children recovery for destruction of the parent-child relationship when it
discussed the alienation of affections action. 72 Then, a later court relied
on those same reasons to deny the children's consortium action. 73 The
aphorism "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" apparently
does not always apply in Washington.
An instance where the aphorism did apply is Lundgren v. Whitney's,
Inc.74 In that case the supreme court permitted a wife to recover for loss
of consortium in large part because the husband has always had a con-
sortium action. 75 The Lundgren court also rejected other traditional rea-
sons for denying consortium actions. 76 As a result of Lundgren, the ra-
tionale of Roth and Erhardt is even more questionable. For example, the
Roth and Erhardt courts relied partially on lack of precedent to deny chil-
dren a cause of action. 77 The Lundgren court, however, said the common
law should change to reflect justice.78 Roth said the problem was legisla-
tive;79 Lundgren said the courts also had responsibility.80
Although defendants may attempt to distinguish Lundgren from the
65. See notes 5 & 35 supra.
66. See note 13 supra.
67. Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wn. App. 13, 510 P.2d 250 (1973).
68. Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App.
92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979).
69. It may also violate the federal equal protection clause or the state privileges and immunities
provision. See WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12; Love, supra note 1, at 593 n. 12.
70. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1979).
72. Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wn. App. 13, 19-20, 510 P.2d 250, 254 (1973).
73. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979).
74. 94Wn. 2d91,614P.2d 1272 (1980).
75. Id. at 96, 614 P.2d at 1275.
76. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text infra.
77. Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 105, 330 P.2d 1010. 1011 (1958); Roth v. Bell. 24
Wn. App. 92, 103, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (1979).
78. Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91, 95, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980).
79. 24 Wn. App. 92, 102, 600 P.2d 602, 608 (1979).
80. 94 Wn. 2d 91, 95,614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980).
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children's consortium cases because a spouse suffers loss of a sexual rela-
tionship, 81 the facts of Lundgren should prevent them from doing so. The
injury to the husband in Lundgren did not affect his sexual capabilities. 82
Moreover, the Lundgren court stressed the loss of companionship and
changed lifestyle occasioned by the husband's injury. 83
Finally, Washington is unusual in that it is one of only three states that
have laws permitting parents to recover for loss of consortium when a
child is injured. 84 While none of these states permits children to recover
in a corresponding situation, Washington is the only one to have denied
the children's action recently. 85
In denying the children's action, the Roth court simply disavowed re-
sponsibility for the inconsistency. 86 Indeed, no state has provided a valid
reason for permitting parents, but not children, to recover.
On the contrary, the California Supreme Court suggested that such a
practice is based on a "historical atavism.' '87 Permitting parents, but-not
children, to recover for loss of consortium suggests that parents are more
likely to suffer severe emotional damages in corresponding situations. In
reality, however, the distinction militates the other way. Children are
more likely than parents to suffer permanent damages from loss of con-
sortium. 88
81. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977) (arguing that sexual relations is an overriding element of consortium). But
see Love, supra note 1.
82. The husband in Lundgren suffered from foot drop. Foot drop does not interfere with normal
sexual functions.
83. 94 Wn. 2d 91, 93, 614 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1980). For instance, the Lundgren court mentioned
that the couple could no longer go dancing after the husband's injury occurred.
84. See IDAHO CODE § 5-310 (Supp. 1980), as construed in Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415,242
P.2d 971 (1952); IowA R. Civ. P. 8 (1951); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1979).
85. Idaho has not had a reported parental consortium case. Iowa denied children an action in
1973. Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581 (1973). Washington recently denied children an action in
Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979). Only Washington has denied children an action
since Michigan, in Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981), became the first jurisdiction to allow the action.
86. 24 Vn. App. 92, 102, 600 P.2d 602, 608(1979).
87. Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 465, 563 P.2d 871, 874, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318
(1977). The "historical atavism" the court referred to was reliance on the common law notion that
while parents had a right to recover for the loss of children's services, children had no correlative
right.
88. In Note, 56 B.U.L. REv., supra note 40, at 742, the author argued that an adult is better able
to establish a new relationship that mitigates the loss of a loved one. The author cited P. MUSSEN, J.
CONGER & J. KAGAN, CHtLD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY 163-64, 397-98 (3d ed. 1969) and
McCord, McCord & Thurber, Some Effects of Paternal Absence on Male Children, 64 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCH. 361 (1962), to support his argument.
The appellants in Roth also cited several psychological studies analyzing the importance of a par-
ent-child relationship. Brief for Appellant at 9-13, Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602
(1979).
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C. The Need for a Child's Separate Action
A reading of Erhardt suggests that a child can recover damages for loss
of parental consortium in his parent's own personal injury action. 89 De-
spite this suggestion, it is unlikely that a child can adequately recover
unless he is given his own separate action. Unless the child has a separate
action, the jury probably will not award him damages since he cannot
argue for them. Further, even if the jury includes some of the child's
damages in the parent's award, the child is not assured of receiving it.
Only a direct award to the child can ensure benefit to the child. Further-
more, there may be instances where the injured parent cannot or does not
bring an action. In such cases, the child has no possibility of recovery at
all .90
Courts admit that children suffer a great loss when a parent is severely
injured. They understand that crippling injuries to parents can be devas-
tating to children. Of course, compensating the injured parent for his loss
of income helps the child. In many instances, however, parental love and
companionship are more necessary to the child than parental financial
support. 91 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
children have a basic right to receive a parent's love and companion-
ship. 92 Yet, only two state courts have permitted children to recover for
loss of that right when a parent is seriously injured. 93
Corrective action is overdue.
IV. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR STATUTORY ACTION
The legislature is a proper place for corrective action. If it were to ana-
lyze a child's cause of action, the legislature could hear all points of view
and balance competing interests. It could minimize potential problems for
the courts and address any legitimate policy concerns. It could also place
limitations on the action that would lessen the impact on tortfeasors' and
society's pockets. Finally, it could provide a single source of clear guid-
ance in a murky area.
Although no state currently has a statute allowing children to recover
for loss of parental consortium, several states have statutory spousal con-
sortium actions. 94 These spousal consortium statutes have been brief.
89. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
90. Unless this is the Erhardt court's "compelling necessity." See note 19 supra.
91. See note 88 supra.
92. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
93. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber,
82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981).
94. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1968); S.C. CODE § 15-75-20 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 25-1-106 (1980).
498
Vol. 56:487, 1981
Children's Loss of Consortium
Consequently, courts in those jurisdictions have continued to wrestle with
avoidable questions after the statute's enactment. 95 If the Washington leg-
islature would instead enact a detailed parental consortium statute, those
problems might be averted.
Statutory specificity is particularly valuable when litigants claim con-
sortium damages. Arguably, every injury to a parent causes the child
some loss of consortium. But in most cases, the damages would be less
than the costs required to litigate them. Here the legislature's ability to
balance competing interests proves most effective. By limiting recovery
to situations where the injury to the parent is severe, the legislature could
minimize societal costs without ignoring serious injury.
In the following subsections, this comment proposes guidelines for a
limited action by children to recover for loss of parental consortium.96
Some of these limitations are more restrictive than limitations on other
existing consortium actions. 97 The proposed restrictions, however, are in-
tended to provide equitable treatment to both the tortfeasor and the child.
A. Class of Litigants
Only dependent children should be able to sue for loss of parental con-
sortium.98 Doubtless, an independent adult child also loses love and com-
panionship when his parent is injured, but in most cases consortium loss
decreases with age. A child's emotional dependence is much greater
when he is younger.99 Limiting the consortium action to dependent chil-
dren would compensate serious injury and avoid argument over less se-
vere or nonexistent injuries. Permitting adult children to recover would be
theoretically ideal, but practically wasteful. The legislature properly can
avoid that waste. 100
95. For example, the court in Bromfield v. Seybolt Motors, Inc., 109 N.H. 501, 256 A.2d 151
(1969), had to determine whether N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1968) permitted retroactivity.
96. Some of the guidelines proposed here were previously proposed in Love, supra note 1. Nev-
ertheless, no legislature has acted to create a child's action, and courts are generally no more recep-
tive. This comment attempts to expand on Professor Love's analysis to meet more recently expressed
concerns-especially in Washington.
97. For example, none of the spousal consortium statutes cited in note 94 supra contain restric-
tive limitations (except in some cases with regard to retroactivity and double recovery). Similarly, the
only limitation that the court in Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980),
placed on recovery for loss of spousal consortium is that the claimant must be married.
98. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court included a similar limitation when it allowed a
child to sue for loss of parental consortium. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d
690 (Mass. 1980).
99. See studies cited in note 88 supra.
100. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 51.04.010-.98.080 (1979) (worker's compensation laws).
The limitations on actions under worker's compensation statutes are much more severe than the limi-
tations proposed in this comment.
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B. Severity of Injury
Recovery should be allowed only when the parent is severely in-
jured.101 Although a child may suffer some loss of consortium when his
parent is not severely injured, it is not likely that the child's damages
would warrant litigation. For instance, one child whose parent suffers a
broken leg may temporarily be unable to participate in normal activities
with his parent. On the other hand, another child whose parent is para-
lyzed from the waist down is likely to see his former parent-child lifestyle
disintegrate. In the latter case the child's injury is much more compelling
and the damages are less likely to be disputed. By refusing to permit the
child's recovery when the parent is less severely injured, the legislature
would not be unfairly ignoring injury. Rather, it would be acknowledging
its responsibility to balance the injury against the cost of providing re-
lief. 102 Limiting the action would avoid needless consideration of minor
damages. 103
Determining which injuries are severe, of course, presents a problem
for the courts. One approach would be for the statute to rely on judicial
discretion. 04 Alternatively, the legislature could define "severe injury"
just as worker's compensation statutes define "permanent disability." 05
For example, parental blindness, deafness, or paralysis caused by a tort-
Indeed, under Washington courts' interpretations, a spouse cannot sue for loss of consortium at all
when the injured spouse is covered by state industrial insurance. Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc.. 43 Wn. 2d
345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953). Although this comment does not address this issue, there seem to be valid
arguments why worker's compensation should not preclude the injured worker's family members
from recovering for loss of consortium. See generally Comment, The Scope of the Exclusive Remedy
Clause in California's Worker's Compensation Act: Should It Include Third Party Actions for Loss of
Consortium?, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 252 (1975).
101. The Michigan court adopted this limitation in Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199. 267
N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981). The court stated:
Probably in the vast majority of cases involving parental injury, the injury will not be so severe
that the child suffers a loss of society and companionship. But in cases, for example, where a
parent is severely crippled or suffers brain damage a child will be deprived of parental guidance.
love and affection.
Id. at 128.
102. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 101, 600 P.2d 602, 607-08 (1979).
103. An alternative to the limitation proposed here would be to allow consortium recovery only
when the child is severely injured. Such a limitation would recognize that a child may suffer greatly
when a parent is less severely injured. This case might occur if the child was unusually dependent on
the parent.
The disadvantage of this alternative is that determining the child's injury is more subjective than
determining the parent's physical injury. The result may be to permit argument of damages for loss of
consortium in all cases where the parent is injured.
104. See, e.g., Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd 49
U.S.L.W. 2648 (1981).
105. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.08.150,.160 (1979).
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feasor could trigger the child's consortium action. Mental impairment of
the parent should also trigger the child's recovery. However, since such
injury is more difficult to measure than physical injury, all cases of
proven mental impairment to the parent should be considered severe.
Rigidifying the standards that permit a child to sue for loss of con-
sortium may appear to some skeptics to superficially, and perhaps decep-
tively, make an abstract injury seem concrete. Such rigid standards, how-
ever, provide a clear guide, and decrease the chance of unwarranted
recovery.
C. Offset for the Parent's Comparative Negligence
The comparative negligence of the parent should offset the child's re-
covery. 106 For example, if a jury finds that a parent is ten percent negli-
gent, not only the parent's but the child's award should be reduced
by ten percent. The child's injury results from the injury to the parent. It
would therefore be unfair to hold the tortfeasor responsible for all of the
child's damages when he may be only partially responsible for the par-
ent's injury.
Permitting tortfeasors to use the negligence of the parent as a partial
defense to an action by a child would not only be equitable, but it would
also comport with the predominant treatment of spousal consortium
claims' 07-the tortfeasor simply should not pay for another party's negli-
gence.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979).
107. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 469 (1968) for cases where contributory and comparative negli-
gence have offset spousal consortium recovery. See also Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574,
579-80 (1974) (Uhlenhopp, J., dissenting). Justice Uhlenhopp suggested that "[a]pplication of com-
parative negligence would most adequately rectify the injustice" that applying, or not applying, con-
tributory negligence in consortium actions causes. Id. at 579.
But see F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, JR., TrE LAW OF TORTS § 8.9, at 640 (1956) (suggesting that a
husband should not be barred by a wife's negligence from bringing an action for loss of consortium).
Similarly, Love, supra note 1, at 628-33, suggested the better view is that contributory negligence
should not be a bar. Professor Love argued that the action for loss of consortium is independent, and
not derivative. Defenses asserted against the physically injured party could therefore not be used to
bar the party claiming damages for loss of consortium.
Washington, however, did not go so far as to state that a spouse's action is independent of the
injured spouse's action. See Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980).
Moreover, RCW § 4.22.020 seemingly does not apply to derivative actions. WASH. Rv. CODE §
4.22.020 (1979) (stating that comparative negligence of a spouse should not be imputed to another
spouse). Furthermore, even Professor Love suggested that comparative negligence may be the best
solution from a policy standpoint. Love, supra note 1, at 631-32 n.237.
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D. Procedural Guidelines
Several procedural rules should be incorporated into any statute author-
izing a child to sue for loss of parental consortium. First, all family mem-
bers should be required to join in one personal injury action. 108 Such a
limitation prevents multiple litigation and double recovery.
Second, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem, other than a par-
ent, to represent the child. Since the child's interests are not identical to
his parent's, 109 the guardian ad litem would ensure that the child was fully
represented.
Third, the statute should prescribe a model jury instruction that delim-
its the damages which are properly recoverable by the child. " 0 The in-
struction should stress emotional damage, and unambiguously exclude
economic damages. For example, recoverable damages should include
loss of love, companionship, advice, and affection. On the other hand,
loss of economic support, loss of the parent's services, and compensation
for any of the child's future services to the parent should not be recover-
able and should be expressly excluded. These excluded economic items
are all fully recoverable by the parent in his own action. " To permit the
jury to consider such damage again in the child's action would substanti-
ate the judicial fear of double recovery.
Finally, the legislature should permit only limited retroactive applica-
tion of the statute. 112 Only those children whose injured parents have not
filed their own action prior to the effective date should be permitted to
recover. Neither reopening concluded parents' cases nor disturbing ac-
tions in progress should be permitted. Reopening concluded cases could
result in double recovery since the jury in the child's action may not know
what was awarded in the parent's action. 11 3 Disturbing actions between
the tortfeasor and parent which began before the effective date would be
economically wasteful. Limited retroactivity is an equitable method of
lessening the impact of the child's consortium action.
108. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
109. For example, a parent may be tempted to settle with the defendant by dropping any claim of
the children for loss of consortium.
110. Such an instruction was also suggested in Note, 56 B.U.L. REv., supra note 40, at 736.
One commentator advocates a more concise jury instruction. Love, supra note 1, at 617.
111. See note I I supra.
112. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 15-75-20 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-1-106 (1980) (spousal
consortium statutes prohibiting retroactivity).
113. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
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E. An All-Inclusive Consortium Statute
Instead of only enacting a statute pertaining to loss of parental con-
sortium, the legislature should consider enacting a statute that addresses
all consortium actions. By doing so, the legislature could settle many
problems before they develop. For example, even after Lundgren v. Whit-
ney's, Inc., 114 questions concerning spousal consortium remain. Wash-
ington courts have yet to decide whether a spouse should be required to
join in the injured spouse's action or whether the injured spouse's negli-
gence should offset the other spouse's recovery. A statute with the guide-
lines proposed here would answer these questions.
An all-inclusive consortium statute would also designate which actions
are allowable. 115 The arguments why the legislature should analyze chil-
dren's actions1 16 apply equally to other possible consortium actions. Al-
though the legislature would have to balance the merits of each proposed
action separately, it could limit all consortium actions similarly. Therein
lies the value of an all-inclusive statute-comprehensive legislative ac-
tion is more efficient than separate attention to each new consortium
claim.
V. THE COURT'S ROLE IN RECOGNIZING
CHILDREN'S RECOVERY
In the face of continued legislative inaction, the courts should allow
children to recover for loss of parental consortium. Although the legisla-
ture may be better able to frame an appropriately limited cause of action,
it has not acted. This inaction should not relieve the courts from their
responsibility.
Indeed, current judicial sentiment in Washington almost makes judicial
action imperative. The supreme court in Lundgren permitted spousal con-
sortium recovery. 17 In so doing, it stated that when a court refuses to
reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule, it abdicates judicial
responsibility. 118 The Lundgren court specifically stated that the common
law limits on actions for loss of consortium should not be left unchanged
114. 94Wn. 2d91,614P.2d 1272(1980).
115. Without such a statute, persons likely to ask for recovery of lost consortium in the near
future are unmarried cohabitants, homosexual spouses, and siblings.
116. See introduction to Section IV in text.
117. Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91,614 P.2d 1272 (1980).
118. Id. at 95, 614 P.2d at 1275 (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382,
393-94, 525 P.2d 669, 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772 (1974)).
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in hopes that the legislature might act. 119 Far from the hesitancy of the
Roth court to deviate from the common law, the Lundgren court empha-
sized the overriding importance of compensating for a serious injury.
The legislature may act on the matter, but it has accomplished little so
far. Washington courts ought to follow the spirit of the Lundgren court-
they should stop passing the buck.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the legal system is not a panacea, it has a responsibility to
compensate for the most serious injuries. It must consider competing con-
siderations, but should not ignore serious injury by pointing to problems
that can easily be controlled.
Courts first admit that a child who loses his parent's love is seriously
injured. Then, the courts refuse to allow the child to recover for that in-
jury. At the same time, other members of the child's family can recover
for arguably less serious consortium losses. Such inconsistency is irra-
tional and unjust. It is time that the interests of children be equally pro-
tected.
Gino L. Gabrio
119. When Washington denied a spouse a cause of action for loss of consortium in Ash v. S.S.
Mullen, Inc., 43 Wn. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953), it chose to ignore the then recent decision of
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), which first
permitted such actions. It was not until nearly 30 years later that the court realized the unfairness of
denying spousal consortium actions. Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wn. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272
(1980).
When Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979), denied children a consortium action,
the decision in Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W.
2648 (1981), permitting such actions was also recent.
After Hitaffer, the majority of courts permitted spouses to recover. Since Berger, at least one more
court has allowed children to recover. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690
(Mass. 1980). Washington should be wary of again being on the tail end of a trend in the development
of the law of consortium.
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